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Abstract—With the fast development of video and voice
network applications, CDN (Content Distribution Networks)
and P2P (Peer-to-Peer) content distribution technologies have
gradually matured. How to effectively use Internet resources
thus has attracted more and more attentions. For the study
of resource pricing, a whole pricing strategy containing pricing
models, mechanisms and methods covers all the related topics.
We first introduce three basic Internet resource pricing models
through an Internet cost analysis. Then, with the evolution of
service types, we introduce several corresponding mechanisms
which can ensure pricing implementation and resource allocation.
On network resource pricing methods, we discuss the utility
optimization in economics, and emphasize two classes of pricing
methods (including system optimization and entities’ strategic
optimizations). Finally, we conclude the paper and forecast the
research direction on pricing strategy which is applicable to novel
service situation in the near future.
Index Terms—Internet, pricing strategy, service type, optimiza-
tion, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Too many packets will incur network performance degra-
dation, which is called congestion [1]. Congestion is caused
by unbalanced resource and traffic distribution, and thus will
not be automatically eliminated with the increase of network
capacity. In packet switched network, the selfish nature of
users makes this happen. As shown by Hardin [2], “tragedy
of commons” occurs when many individuals share public
resources and each holds a selfish objective, which means the
loss they bring to others is larger than their own improved
benefits. So, if the network is used as public goods, there
always exists the possibility that the overall personal excessive
usage will cause system performance decline and thus the
congestion problem.
In recent years, high bandwidth, low latency, low jitter and
other higher QoS applications are getting increasingly popular.
Thus the surges of network traffic makes network congestion
more frequent and serious. Accordingly, the novel content
distribution technologies and mechanisms to ensure network
QoS are constantly proposed and improved. For the former,
commonly, a new layer of network architecture, the application
layer network (Overlay Network [3]) is added in the existing
Internet to realize the corresponding transmission and QoS
control, such as P2P (Peer-to-Peer) [4] and CDN (Content
Distribution Networks) [5]. For the latter, mechanisms are de-
veloped to work at all levels of QoS control, such as transport
layer and network layer concerning network service structures.
In short, they both serve network resource management and
congestion control.
However, on the one hand, network traffic surges and keeps
increasing. As Valancius [7] shown in Fig. 1, videos and
P2P traffic occupy a large part of network resources and
will become even more in the coming years. On the other
hand, different application layer networks have their own
selfish traffic demands and QoS control mechanisms. This
makes network management and maintainence increasingly
difficult [6]. As an earlier best-effort network service type,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) often meet the increasingly
high QoS requirements by upgrading network infrastructure
or increasing network capacity. However, in the long run,
short-term investments usually bring high cost and fail to
satisfy the fast-growing network resource requirement, which
is against the healthy network development. Therefore, QoS
control technologies need to be introduced in best-effort net-
work. From the perspective of improving network resource
usage and management, network designers and ISPs usually
passively conduct QoS control based on the existing network
traffic, such as congestion control [8]-[10], and traffic engi-
neering [11]. But these often complicate network protocol
design and implementation. Proactively setting QoS levels of
flows for simple QoS control (priority-based QoS mechanism
[13][14]) and designing network architecture to ensure QoS
(such as IntServ [15] and DiffServ [16]) have also been studied
extensively. But due to some technological limitations and lack
of incentives, they have not been implemented throughout the
network.
In fact, for network designers, it is very effective to improve
network performance using the enhanced transport layer proto-
col design and related underlayer techniques [9][10]. However,
they do not care about the types of high-level applications.
Thus the corresponding QoS differentiation is hard to ensure.
As a result, promoting reasonable and efficient usage of
network resources based on applications is more and more
emphasized. And the related service types that can provide
different QoS levels on different applications are also under
in-depth study. Earlier, priority-based network service layering
[13][14] tries to achieve a certain level of packet transmission
QoS differentiation based on distinguishing the high-level
application characteristics of packets. Then, the proposed
IntServ architecture [15] guarantees applications’ QoS by per-
flow resource reservation, and DiffServ [16] modifies the
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ABSTRACT
Motivated by increased concern over energy consumption in mod-
ern data centers, we propose a new, distributed computing platform
called Nano Data Centers (NaDa). NaDa uses ISP-controlled home
gateways to provide computing and storage services and adopts a
managed peer-to-peer model to form a distributed data center in-
frastructure. To evaluate the potential for energy savings in NaDa
platform we pick Video-on-Demand (VoD) services. We develop
an energy consumption model for VoD in traditional and in NaDa
data centers and evaluate this model using a large set of empiri-
cal VoD access data. We find that even under the most pessimistic
scenarios, NaDa saves at least 20% to 30% of the energy com-
pared to traditional data centers. These savings stem from energy-
preserving properties inherent to NaDa such as the reuse of al-
ready committed baseline power on underutilized gateways, the
avoidance of cooling costs, and the reduction of network energy
consumption as a result of demand and service co-localization in
NaDa.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—Distributed Applications
General Terms
Design, Management, Measurument
Keywords
Energy Efficiency, Data Centers, Nano Data Centers, Video
Streaming
1. INTRODUCTION
Most current Internet applications are served from a large num-
ber of collocated servers stacked together in one of several data
center facilities around the world. This centralized hosting model is
a classic example of the economies of scale: large numbers of sim-
ilar servers yields relatively low manning requirements and eases
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Figure 1: Growth of video content in the Internet.
procurement procedures. Homogeneous hosting environments al-
low for better optimization and at the same time provide trans-
parency to developers.
Centralization trend is not without its limitations. Data centers
are prone to: 1) over-provisioning, 2) hight cost of heat dissipa-
tion, and 3) increased distance to end-users. All of these issues,
as we will see later, lead to ever increasing energy bills that the
data center and network operators need to foot. The data centers
are over-provisioned because they need to match the peak demand
despite that the average load remains much lower throughout most
of the day; in addition, redundancy requirements might push up
the number of necessary servers significantly. Data centers also
are expensive to cool. Despite significant efforts for improving the
server power-efficiency, an average data center spends as much en-
ergy on cooling as it spends for powering its servers [23]. Even
in the data centers using state-of-the-art cooling technologies heat
dissipation accounts for at least 20% to 50% of the total power con-
sumption [4]. Centralization trend also increases the data center
distance to the users. Not every service can be hosted at well con-
nected central interconnection points. Higher distance from end
users increases bandwidth-mileage requirements and adds to the
energy consumption of the networking equipment. It is not sur-
prising therefore that data centers recently made headlines with re-
ports that they consume 1.5% of total US electricity [3], or that
their carbon-dioxide emissions are projected to surpass those of the
airline industry by the year 2020 [6]. These concerns are indeed
expected to amplify in view of growth projections of data center-
Fig. 1. Internet video content growth. [7]
IntServ architecture using priorities based on aggregated flow
control. Theoretically, they can improve network resource-use
efficiency, indicating a QoS guarante d service era is coming.
However, in addi on to technical difficulty and deployment
complexity, th y are generally achieving high-priority service
QoS guarantee at the expe se of low-priority services without
congestion elimination attempts in nature. Furthermore, due
to the distributed management features of the Internet, ISPs
lack adequate enthusiasm to collaboratively improve network
performance and efficiency without appropriate incentives.
Thus QoS guarantee is difficult to implement in the whole
network.
B. Resource Pricing
From the above discussion, we note that design incentives
at economical level to encourage ISPs in improving network
performance and directing users to use the resources rationally,
will be of great significance in effective network resource
management and distribution [39]. Such methods are based
on the utility optimization theory in economics, which affects
users’ demand and bel ngs to acti e resource management
mechanism. Simply speaking, ISPs can effectively influ nce
users’ demands ne work resou ce usage by choosing
rational pricing strategies, thus prompting efficient network
usage and nsuring network p rformance. Particularly, as an
important auxiliary aspect of technological progress (economic
incentives [22]), pricing mechanism studies suited to service
type development are also important. Therefore, a complete
picture of network pricing should include three aspects: basic
pricing models, mechanisms to ensure pricing implementation,
and methods determining optimal pricing levels.
Specifically, first of all, pricing models decide which factors
to charge, or how to evaluate network operating and maintain-
ing costs. Mason and Varian [18][19] analyzed the major fee
component from users’ cost point of view. This includes: a
fixed fee to provide basic service structure costs such as leased
lines, routing equipment maintenance, and human resource
utilities; marginal costs of access; network expansion costs;
marginal costs of sending data packets into the congested
network; and social costs that cause negative impact on other
users. The authors believe a good price should reflect these
costs. So, we introduce three basic pricing models concerning
these costs: flat pricing [18], usage pricing[21][22][25] and
congestion pricing [18][29]-[37].
As applications are simple and resources are sufficient at the
beginning of the Internet, it is convenient to charge users using
a static flat pricing model, where users have the same usage-
irrelative fixed fees with equal access rates. The advantages
are that complex audit and statistics are unnecessary, and thus
facilitates network users. So, they increasingly enrich net-
work contents. However, too many contents eventually causes
network resources lacking.And the defects of flat pricing
gradually emerge. For the system, due to lacking of incentives
for efficient network resource usage [20] (a lot of bandwidth
are wasted by non-critical applications), the overall network
performance degrades. For users, the experience deteriorates
and the fairness cannot be guaranteed. Obviously, flat pricing is
no longer applicable. Thus, a more effective resource pricing
model “usage-based pricing” was proposed [21]. It pointed
out that if the charge is related with usage, fair and efficient
use of resources will be promoted to some extent. However,
with a further increase in network traffic, the aggravated
congestion makes the related pricing a hot research area,
resulting in a relatively dynamic pricing model “congestion
pricing” [18][19] which are studied extensively. Besides, these
three pricing models can be used in any combination since they
reflect different cost components.
As for pricing mechanisms, they mainly aim to address
the matching problem between network service types and
pricing models. Namely, for different types of network ser-
vices, we need to select and design suitable pricing models.
Good pricing mechanism can set rational price structures for
users and ensure pricing implementation with an acceptable
technical complexity measure [12]. Generally, in best-effort
network, ISPs always adjust the basic pricing model to pro-
mote the rational use of resources based on their network
capacity, where no additional QoS control mechanisms are
conducted. Odlyzko’s PMP (Paris Metro Pricing [55]) pric-
ing aims to achieve QoS differentiation and thus enhances
efficiency through dividing network into several subnets in
best-effort network. However, with the increasing emphasis
on applications’ QoS and network resource usage efficiency,
network designers and ISPs both tend to serve different
data streams with different QoS and price levels. Simple
priority-based pricing was first proposed by Cocchi et al.
[13] [14]. The authors suggested to implement prioritized
service using priority field in IP packets, and thus they can
conduct service layering and corresponding pricing. Similar
thoughts can be found in [42]. With progressive development
of various network service types, QoS guaranteed network
architectures (such as IntServ and DiffServ) are gradually
studied in recent years, followed by corresponding pricing
models. QoS based network resource pricing mechanisms are
thus formulated [43]-[51][56]-[60]. We discuss pricing models
suitable to various service types in Section 3.
3For the last aspect of pricing strategy, pricing methods
applicable to pricing model/mechanism are still an important
research aspect. It mainly determines how to set a reason-
able price level. An ideal pricing method should be able
to set price levels that can control resource usages so as
to achieve its pricing objectives while achieving efficiency.
Determining prices is usually based on relevant fields of
pricing and utility optimization in economic theories under
specific market environments. Such work is often based on
different market structures (such as monopoly and competitive
network) and network service mechanisms (such as best-effort
and QoS guaranteed service network). After studying each
entity’s utility, different theory models are used to describe
their interactive optimization processes. The theoretical bases
are mainly optimization theory and game theory. Thus there
are two major research lines: (1) Studying pricing based on
system optimization (Network Utility Maximization, NUM
[30][31]) always lies in optimization theory [74]; (2) Studying
pricing based on strategic optimizations of ISPs and users.
That is, when analyzing each player’s decision making, one
should take into account effects from strategic behaviors of
other players. This work is mainly based on two major
theoretical branches of game theory: non-cooperative game
theory [75][84] (related models such as in [77]-[82]), and
cooperative game theory [83]-[85] (related models such as in
[87][91][92]).
C. Organizations
As shown in Fig.2, the remainder of the paper presents a
detailed survey on Internet pricing development. In Section
2, we present three main pricing models proposed in earlier
years. Then, integrated with pricing models, we introduce
pricing mechanisms based on two types of services in Section
3. In Section 4, we introduce price level setting methods based
on two classes of optimizations, including system optimiza-
tion and entities’ strategic optimizations in different network
marketing environments, which can economically incentivize
technology development. We classify and compare typical
pricing strategies in Section 5 based on different pricing
models, serving mechanisms and pricing methods involved.
Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper, predict the
reasonable pricing strategies for new applications and network
services, and point out several future research topics.
II. BASIC PRICING MODELS
In the study of pricing models, the main idea is to decide
pricing factors based on ISPs’ costs. In traditional best-effort
network, three basic models can be used for network pricing
based on cost analysis. The three models are also important
factors in the pricing of subsequent QoS guaranteed network
services. This section will inform the three basic pricing
models which are gradually evolved in early Internet.
A. Flat pricing
At the early stages of Internet, users use a small quantity
of network resources. Thus ISPs aim to attract a large number
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Fig. 2. The structure of pricing strategies.
of users and occupy the market. They generally adopt unified
price (or flat fee [18]) to charge users based on access costs,
which means in a certain period of time, the users with the
same access speed will be charged at the same price. This is
especially common in broadband access market.
The advantages are as follows. For ISPs, flat pricing is
popular, since it is easy to implement and there is no need
for complex statistical systems. And for users, the charges
can be predicted. However, the more usage, the more obvious
drawbacks. On the one hand, due to lack of effective interac-
tions between users and ISPs, users have no incentives or ideas
about adapting their usage patterns, making network resources
over requested or used. On the other hand, ISPs do not count
individuals’ resource consumptions and treat equally to users
with the same access rate level. This means the overall cost
is equally shared by users with different consumptions and
thus fairness is hard to guarantee. Meanwhile, as there is no
difference in charging users, ISPs lack impetus for upgrading
infrastructure or improving QoS, which is not conductive
to the progress of network technology and makes system
performance degrade.
As to the fairness, Edell and Varaiya studied users’ reactions
on flat pricing through Internet Demand Experiment project
(INDEX [20]). They concluded that light-load users compen-
sate the heavy-load ones under flat pricing, which will cause
resource waste too. The authors assumed unit usage cost is
charged by c, and users request D(c) unit resource according
to demand curve. As using flat pricing model, the marginal
usage cost for users is 0, which makes the demand changed
from D(c) to D(0). Estimated by users’ practical utilities, the
usage over D(c) will cause
∫ c
0
[D(c) − D(0)]dp value loss
to users, as the shade shown in Fig. 3(a) [20]. In addition,
if the flat fee C is charged based on average usage amount,
then C = c × xf (av) = c × D(0). All users’ payments are
shown as the rectangle area in Fig. 3(b) [20]. Clearly, the
light-load users’ payment is more than their gain, while the
heavy-load users are on the contrary. This indicates that the
former compensates the latter when they share resource costs
on average.
As discussed above, in best-effort network without addi-
tional QoS mechanism, flat pricing model is unable to achieve
optimized resource allocation alone. And due to fewer ISPs,
the marketization is not obvious, which worsen the situation
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that ISPs lack incentives to improve network performance.
With the development of network applications and the increas-
ingly complex Internet marketing environment, the model will
no longer apply. But as one of the referential pricing factors,
access charge can be used as a basic guarantee for recovering
the fixed costs.
B. Usage pricing
As the usage and fixed costs have been distinguished and
studied separately, usage-based pricing models come into
being. Currence et al. [22] thought usage-based pricing can
reflect actual use of network resources and is derived from
traditional flat pricing. Simple usage-based pricing uses the
amount of upload and download traffic to charge.
In practice, China Education and Research NETwork (CER-
NET) uses full-rate accounting charges for international traffic
[24]. In addition to such direct traffic statistics, ISPs in general
can use statistical sampling methods to estimate usage, such
as the 95th percentile pricing which is used as an industry
standard. This is in accordance with usage-based pricing, and
the peak flow within 5% of the time (36 hours per month) is
free of charge. Many ISP, such as MCI WorldCom and Level
(3) Communications, have such peak flow rate based charging
standards [22].
Usage-based pricing is analyzed and studied by a lot of
researchers at early stages of the Internet [12][21]-[25]. The
common point is that in general they used supply-demand
balance models in economics to describe the interactions
between users and ISPs. Edell and Varaiya [20] showed in their
experiments that users are highly sensitive to pricing models
and price levels. Usage-based charging, can not only enhance
usage efficiency of network resource, but also play an impor-
tant role in congestion control and fairness guarantee among
users. Edell et al. [21] implemented a usage pricing system
and gave experiments illustrating that dynamic usage pricing
can prevent congestion and improve the average network
performance. Courcoubetis et al. [27] proposed intelligent
agents to decide network usage, based on network conditions
and users’ payment willingness. This simplifies users’ utility
optimization process.
After analyzing the features of flat and usage pricing mod-
els, Altmann and Chu [23] proposed a hybrid pricing model
that combines two. In this novel model, users enjoy basic ser-
vices at a basic flat rate, while higher bandwidth demands will
be charged by usage. The experimental data analysis indicates
that such pricing model can improve network performance and
increase ISP revenue. Obviously, such pricing concerning fixed
and usage cost will benefit all the participants.
Recently, with the continuous development of high-
bandwidth required applications and P2P content distribution
technologies, the overall users’ bandwidth demands increase
dramatically. Consequently, increasingly differentiated usage
patterns make the fairness problem even more serious, which
indicates charging heavy-load users according to usage is
more reasonable [26]. However, in terms of P2P applications’
providers who encourage users to participate in content shar-
ing, such charging scheme will go contrary to their goals.
So, more complicated interactions between P2P application
providers and ISPs are to be carefully studied. In addition,
other problems still need to be addressed, such as the privacy
issues in processing audit and statistics [22] and the charging
problem caused by users’ non-expected traffic (such as ads
and spams).
C. Congestion pricing
The pricing models mentioned above cannot reflect indi-
vidual traffic’s impact on network, such as packet loss and
delay. An intuitive understanding is that, too many concurrent
network users will easily degrade network performance. For
those who have accessed in network, the higher system load,
the higher possibility of congestion. This also means that more
external cost will be caused by users [18].
Researchers expect pricing can constrain this negative exter-
nal effect which is also called social cost. And the correspond-
ing pricing is named congestion pricing [18]. Congestion pric-
ing dynamically sets price that can reflect approximate real-
time network resource usage and represent current social cost.
Thus it can encourage users to adjust traffic demand which
may avoid excessive resource usage. Therefore, congestion can
be relieved or eliminated [29]-[37].
However, measuring such social cost is not trivial. It cannot
be directly calculated or measured as fixed or usage cost but
need to detect users’ perceived value of resources. In general
network performance optimization articles, congestion cost is
described by delay in M/M/1 queuing system [79]. In Mason
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and Varian’s smart market [18] pricing mechanism, an auction
based pricing method was proposed to measure and price such
social cost. As shown in Fig. 4, the steps are as follows: (1)
Users fill in bid fields for each packet on behalf of their
willingness to pay for the packet transmission, e.g., P1(3)
represents user 1’s willingness to pay for its packet is 3; P2(30)
means user 2 is willing to pay 30 for its packet; P3(20) means
user 3 is willing to pay 20. (2) The routing node (auction
point) receives the packets and sorts the packets according to
the bid values. (3) Checking available bandwidth, the routing
node sets marginal bid value as the market clearing price or
threshold price, and decides which packets to be transmitted
(or discarded). In this example, we see that if the node can
only process two packets, the packets from user 2 and user 3
will be transmitted at the price of 20 for each packet, otherwise
discarded.
This can prevent congestion to some extent. Since the
limited resources are allocated to people with high willing-
ness to pay, the allocation will be more efficient. However,
periodic bidding process and threshold price setting require
additional technical supports from network protocols and hard-
ware, making the method more technically complex. MacKie-
Mason [35] further studied the advantages of smart market
using generalized Vickrey auction mechanism [34] (i.e., when
willingness to pay is personal privacy of an auction participate,
the person with the highest bidding value will get the item at
the second highest bidding value) to allocate scarce resources.
The author concluded that the mechanism can promote truthful
expression of users’ utilities, and thus help network to attain
service differentiation with different QoS levels. This kind
of congestion pricing belongs to mechanism design (MD,
[77]), which is always studied in incomplete information game
theory area. We leave out more details here.
There are also some pricing methods using congestion to set
price levels (such as shadow pricing [30][31] and congestion
discount [36]) and the relevant specific implementation mech-
anisms (such as congestion feedback based on TCP explicit
congestion notification ECN). All aspects involved aim to
implement efficient price-aware network resource usage which
can shift the traffic from peak time to non-peak time, and
thus reduce congestion possibility. In fact, time varying usage-
based pricing can also achieve a certain level of congestion
control [21], though it may not base on the analysis of social
cost. Ykusel and Kalyanarama [37] analyzed the relationship
between time granularity of congestion pricing and the re-
sulting congestion level through experiments. They concluded
that when the price interval is more than 40 times of RTT,
the price can hardly affect congestion. So they suggested 2-3
seconds to be the appropriate pricing interval. However, such
fine granularity of congestion pricing is not easy to implement
in the real Internet.
D. Discussion
This section describes basic pricing models based on cost
analysis in traditional best-effort network. They are gradually
proposed and thoroughly studied along with the increase of
network resource usage. Obviously, with the increasing im-
portance of pricing in effective network resource management,
pricing models will consider more factors and be more com-
plex. From performance optimization perspective, this section
describes pricing models with nearly different functions. In
a flat pricing model, the fee is generally constant in a long
period of time and is used to recover the fixed cost. Usage-
based fee is charged to recover usage cost. It can be adjusted to
reflect network congestion and thus plays a role in congestion
control. Congestion pricing is proposed to measure and charge
for congestion. It is a kind of dynamic pricing where price is
dynamically adjusted to congestion.
In fact, these three pricing models are not orthogonal, which
means although they reflect different pricing factors, their
functions can be overlapped to some extent. For example,
“two part tariff” [19] was proposed as a combination of flat
pricing and usage-based pricing. It can reduce congestion to
some extent. In addition, congestion price mainly reflects the
marginal cost of lacked resources. It can also be interpreted
as the potential benefit increase of network users if there is
one more resource unit. Therefore, congestion price is closely
related to the timely network resources usage.
III. PRICING MECHANISMS BASED ON SERVICE TYPE
With more emphasis on QoS and network efficiency, ser-
vices tend to be distinguished by data flow checking. This can
help to achieve differentiated levels of QoS [62]. As a result,
network service types can be divided into best-effort service
and QoS mechanisms related services. Further, it is important
that pricing models should be compatible with network service
types [38]. This means that for different service types, pricing
models should be suitable for charging. And there should have
mechanisms to ensure the implementation of pricing. In this
section, we describe pricing mechanisms to solve the above
matching problem. And a brief analysis and evaluation will be
given later.
A. Best-effort service pricing
In best-effort network, as ISPs generally do not implement
additional QoS control mechanisms, there is nearly no QoS
difference. Thus, ISPs adjust basic pricing models to affect
6resource usage while optimizing economic benefit. Pricing is
always done at network edge, known as edge pricing [38][39].
It means that users’ fees are calculated by the access network
but not directly concerned with intermediate networks along
the whole transmission path.
Supporters hold the following beliefs. On the one hand,
Internet users located in different autonomous system are
often managed and charged by local ISPs. Thus it is more
realistic to charge users at the access side. On the other hand,
as a best-effort service, ISPs provide no QoS guarantee to
whatever traffic traversed through their networks. So pricing
at network edge is more reasonable [38][39].
The basic pricing models suitable to edge pricing include
flat pricing and usage pricing. For congestion pricing, because
congestion could occur in any link along the transmission
path, the price should be set according to path usage status.
Thus it is not applicable to edge pricing. Moreover, for data
packets, there may be multiple paths to select. But routing
or path is not decided by users. So it is unfair to charge
them for the path they use [38]. However, Shenker et al. [38]
pointed out that edge pricing can still refer to approximate
congestion and users’ expected paths.
Clark [39] further discussed localization method for
non-local accounting and pricing, such as setting price for
multicast users and pricing for receiver-paid applications. The
method is based on resource reservation protocol (see Section
3.2.2), where the sender first chooses how much it will pay or
what portion of cost to share with receivers. In [40][41], Clark
suggested edge pricing could use estimated traffic instead of
actual usage to charge users. And receivers can also state their
willingness to pay. ISPs exchange traffic and revenue through
agreements. Later, when bandwidth management devices [42]
are added in the DiffServ architecture (see Section 3.2.3),
the relatively dynamic edge pricing based on expectations or
estimations is also being studied [43]. However, obviously,
the edge pricing lacks influence on congestion control. Yuksel
and Kalyanaraman [44] proposed a distributed dynamic
pricing that is congestion sensitive and whose sensitivity and
complexity are ranged between those of “smart market” and
edge pricing.
Overall, edge pricing is applicable to best-effort network.
ISPs can negotiate with users at access network based on
expected congestion through predicting network states. Thus
they arrive at pricing agreements. The pricing is easy to
implement and can prompt flexible interaction between ISPs
and users (such as ISPs can dynamically adjust price based
on network conditions and users can adjust their QoS re-
quirements according to their expected utilities). However,
edge pricing is unable to conduct congestion control in the
whole network due to networks’ distributed characteristic.
Although agreements exist, network-wide QoS guarantee or
QoS differentiated services are hard to ensure.
However, prioritized services can be implemented in
best-effort network. Odlyzko proposed Paris Metro Pricing
(PMP [55]) model, where a network is divided into several
virtual transmission paths with different capacities and access
prices. Thus users can expect to get differentiated services by
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accessing to different virtual paths. The main idea is that users
can enjoy better performance at a higher possibility by paying
more money. As shown in Fig. 5, the network is logically
divided into channels or virtual paths with different trans-
mission capacity C and corresponding price P . In principle,
selecting channels at higher payment will get better service as
less competitors.
The advantages of PMP are described as follows. As an
edge pricing, paying for access based on expected performance
is easy to implement. Since network providers divide users
into different categories through charging, it is natural to
achieve a certain degree of network resource management
and differentiated services. The disadvantages are that the
network will not maximize its usage efficiency and cannot
ensure QoS. In addition, since it is very likely that different
subnets use different pricing strategies, PMP applies only to a
monopolistic network. So, if the model is to be extended to a
complex network environment with many small networks, the
price setting and revenue sharing should be consulted by those
subnets. As to implementation, Odlyzko stated that users can
simply choose different edge network providers according to
different service qualities they provided. And for ISPs, within
the network, routers are used to identify priority bits in packets
and conduct priority-based scheduling or packet processing.
Similar to PMP, Dube et al. [54] proposed a service dif-
ferentiation method based on queue management. For users,
each chooses and joins a queue according to its price and
length. And for network server, it implements a priority-
based queue scheduling in order to achieve differentiated
resource allocations. Unlike in PMP, users here can estimate
network congestion through queue lengths, and choose a
service queue based on estimated congestion and its price.
It is a profit maximization dynamic pricing model. Dube et
al. used Markov decision theory (MDP) to build up system
model, and presented dynamic price adjustment algorithms.
B. QoS guaranteed service pricing
Facing unachieved QoS differentiation and corresponding
low network resource usage efficiency, a lot of work has
committed to study of differentiated services so as to enhance
7efficiency. Simple priority-based service and corresponding
pricing were first introduced by Cocchi et al. [13][14], which
revealed the relationship between QoS differentiation and
resource usage efficiency. They proposed to add priority field
in IP packet and achieve QoS through priority-based queuing
and scheduling. The corresponding service pricing is thus
being wildly studied [55]-[60].
Then, with the progressive development of various network
service types, to achieve QoS guarantee, various in-depth
studies were conducted regarding network architecture based
on resource reservation [15] and flow aggregation [16]. Also,
related pricing models are studied and integrated into such
QoS-enabled pricing mechanisms [45]-[51].
1) Simple priority-based service pricing: To provide
priority-based services, one reasonable way is to distinguish
traffic by application’s characteristics, as shown in Fig. 6. QoS
based services can be divided into several classes. Generally,
packets are set to different levels of transmission priority and
help to achieve service distinction. The simplest way is using
Type of Service (ToS) fields in IP packets to set priority levels.
Such model is more realistic and implementable though QoS
may not be guaranteed.
With priority-based QoS differentiated services (similar to
DiffServ in Section 3.2.3), a network can provide different
service prices for each service class. And users can decide
which service class to purchase. Since packet transmission for
priority-based service depends on cooperation along the whole
network path, a reasonable revenue sharing scheme may be
required.
For example, Cocchi et al. [13][14] believed that in a multi-
class service coexisted network, if the resource is allocated
based on applications’ characteristics (or users’ requirements),
it will not only benefit users of all kinds of services, but also
prompt an efficient network resource allocation. The basic idea
is that for users to represent their utilities by filling priority
fields in data packets. This will help network to implement user
utility aware resource allocation (e.g., high priority packets
will be processed earlier to avoid delay). Of course, packet
transmission with higher priority will be charged at higher
price.
Specifically, here user utility is determined by price and QoS
level U = −V − C, where transmission cost is represented
by C, and V measures the performance degradation (such as
delay and packet loss rate). So applications such as FTP and
Voice have different V and thus will adopt different priorities.
Therefore pi,j (i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1) denotes four priority
categories, where i = 1 denotes using priority, and j = 1
indicates the packet should not be discarded. Then if QoS
is emphasized, the user will choose p1,1 service class. And
if the price is considered more, then p0,0 service class will
be more applicable. Obviously, for price levels, it will be
p0,0 < {p0,1, p1,0} < p1,1. The corresponding relationships
are: Email → p0,0, FTP → p0,1, Voice → p1,0 and the like.
Simulation results show that differentiated service and pricing
can incentivize users to choose appropriate service priorities.
And the authors concluded that if revenue attained by such way
is the same as what is gained without QoS differentiation, the
former will achieve higher total utility. However, since service
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price is pre-set here, when idle resources exist, users will still
pay more for prioritized services without QoS guarantee. So
this is a preliminary work that uses ToS field to differentiate
services and thus price differently.
Similar to Cocchi et al, Donnell and Sethu [53] also
suggested setting priorities or service classes for data packets
by end user systems. Then, routers allocate them into different
queues to ensure various service priorities. As to pricing
implementation, the price field of a packet is filled in, which
represents the payment for such transmission. Then when the
packet reaches its destination, the price information is copied
to ACK and returned to the sender. So the user (sender) can
determine its sending rate and dynamically select the service
class based on the received price information in ACK.
Gupta et al. [56][57] proposed a more complex dynamic
priority-based pricing mechanism, and designed a real-time
external price calculation method based on the degree of
congestion in multi-class service environment. Their simula-
tion showed that dynamic pricing can significantly improve
network performance and increase revenue. In order to avoid
users to distribute traffics into non-matching service classes,
[57] studied how to set appropriate price to encourage users in
matching traffic type and service class in multi-class service
network.
Priority-based service pricing can achieve average perfor-
mance differentiation if the price and traffic are relatively
stable during a long time period. However, in the short term,
it is likely that a high-priority service indeed experiences
more packet loss, longer delay, serious congestion and so
on. To solve this problem, [59][60] studied the proportional
differentiated service model which provides a relatively dy-
namic bandwidth division scheme. The main idea is that, as
an expansion of best-effort service type, the model will not
strictly set bandwidth for each service class. Instead, it will use
proportional performance guarantee to achieve predictable and
controllable QoS distinction (based on well designed packet
scheduling and packet discard mechanism). Compared with the
fixed priority service, the corresponding proportional pricing
model is more applicable to such service models.
2) IntServ-based service pricing: In best-effort network
and simple priority-based service network, QoS is not guar-
anteed. Accordingly, pricing usually depends on actual cost
or resource usage. In contrast, this section will describe
8Integrated Service (IntServ [15]) mechanism, which achieves
QoS guarantee from the perspective of resource reservation.
Thus the corresponding pricing is extended from edge network
to the entire resource reservation or QoS guaranteed path.
IntServ bases on end-to-end Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP [17]) to reserve resources for each flow. It is a
single-flow based architecture that can provide end-to-end
QoS guarantee. The overall mechanism needs all routers to
process each flow’s signaling messages, maintain its path and
resource reservation status on control path, and perform flow-
based classification and scheduling on data path. More specif-
ically, based on packet transmission control, routers convert
IP packets to traffic flows first. Then RSVP-enabled routers
establish or dismantle resource reservation status of each flow
according to their judgments on whether the path has sufficient
resources to meet each incoming flow’s QoS requirements. If
met, based on packets’ statuses, they implement QoS routing,
corresponding scheduling and other controls to ensure the
required QoS.
Karsten et al. [45] studied a pricing mechanism applicable to
RSVP, as shown in Fig. 7. The main idea is to add price related
information to regular RSVP messages and thus to achieve
resource reservation and pricing conciliation. Specifically, the
authors added Downstream Charging Policy Element (DCPE)
in PATH message and Upstream Charging Policy Element
(UCPE) in RESV message, where PATH and RESV are both
regular RSVP messages (the description of DCPE and UCPE
can be found in Fig. 7). Then, the mechanism works as
follows: first of all, it is sender S that describes the flow’s char-
acteristics in PATH message and initiates DCPE to show its
share of payment in the whole transmission (in 〈sender share〉
field in DCPE). Then, each intermediate RSVP router (IS)
who receives this information will modify DCPE by storing its
local price into 〈total charge〉, fill duration time information,
and pass on PATH message. When PATH messages reaches
R1 and R2, if any receiver accepts the service with such
charging information, it sends RESV messages back with
filled UCPEs. Specifically, the receivers calculate how much
to pay based on the received DCPEs. They set 〈payment〉 in
UCPEs to show their cost sharing and copy the 〈total charge〉
fields. When RESV reaches IS, IS reserves resources, modifies
〈sender payment〉 information and passes on RESV. Upon
sender S receives RESV eventually, the 〈payment〉 field carries
the total charge paid by receivers. The 〈sender payment〉
shows the fraction of charge on the sender, and 〈total charge〉
carries the sum of all charges for this resource reservation.
Obviously, this pricing mechanism has much flexibility in
sharing cost between senders and receivers. And thus it can
support pricing for many applications such as one or two side
pay.
Similarly, Clark [46] proposed a zone-based charging or cost
sharing model. In this model, a willingness to pay information
is inserted into an IP packet to show whether the two sides
(sender and receiver) are willing to pay for high quality of
services. However, it gave no more study on dynamic pricing
and QoS class based pricing. Fankhauser et al. [47] proposed
a RSVP-based accounting and charging protocol which is
applicable to IntServ architecture. The authors showed such
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Fig. 7. Example of pricing session based on RSVP. [45]
implementation can support local pricing models well using
two pricing models. One is auction-based pricing model
(adding bidding field in the RESV message), and the other is
a congestion sensitive usage-based pricing model. However,
it needs to assume that the network performs static routing
which will not be affected by price, and each pricing node in
the network prices at the same pace.
In fact, flow-based resource reservation is hard to achieve.
It needs to realize flow-based access control, QoS routing and
related scheduling which will bring in huge system cost, and
thus is very complex. Therefore, the realization of IntServ with
QoS guarantee is not common, and only few applications exist.
The improved IntServ and the corresponding pricing models
are also under research.
3) DiffServ-based service pricing: As RSVP-based IntServ
architecture has high complexity and less scalability, Differ-
entiated Services (DiffServ[16]) architecture is then proposed
by IETF. Accordingly, the corresponding pricing is widely
studied.
In DiffServ architecture, complex flow control mechanism
is realized at boundary nodes of the network. Thus service
mechanism of network inward nodes is simplified. Specifically,
the boundary nodes use users’ flow profiles and resource
reservation information to conduct flow-classification, shaping
and aggregation, resulting in flows divided into different flow
aggregations. And the aggregation information is stored in
DS (Differentiated Service) field of IP packets called Dif-
ferentiated Service Code Point (DSCP). Then the internal
nodes schedule and forward IP packets in accordance with
DSCP in packet-headers which represent the specified QoS
requirements or service levels. DiffServ is a hierarchical
service structure. Each DS region adopts SLA (Service Level
Agreement [16] , i.e., a service contract between a customer
and a service provider that specifies the service a customer
should receive) and TCA (Traffic Conditioning Agreement)
[16] to conduct coordination and thus to provide cross-regional
services. SLA clearly describes the supported service level and
the allowed traffic volume in each service level, and TCA is
used in detailed QoS negotiation.
Pricing is usually based on SLA in DiffServ architecture.
Since SLA can be a static or dynamic contract used to describe
the specified QoS level on data path, the corresponding pricing
can also change with SLA’s variation pace. In static SLA,
regular consultations are needed. While in dynamic SLA,
users need signaling protocol (e.g., RSVP) to help request
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service dynamically. And transformation is needed to match
service requirements with DSCP value (no matter by user or
edge router). Then, accordingly, the price for differentiated
service depends on SLA and actual network resource usage.
Fankhauser and Plattner [48] proposed an implementation
profile to describe resource transactions in networks, which
is based on bandwidth broker to act as an SLA trader or
negotiator. The essence is that through negotiation between
bandwidth brokers of each adjacent ISP, an ISP can provide
its neighbors with its own network resources as well as the
resources it purchased from other adjacent ISPs. Therefore the
Internet-wide communication can be achieved. For example,
in core network, as shown in Fig. 8, there are six DS domains:
A, B, C, D, E and F. Each DS domain represents an ISP. Then
B may offer service with destination E to network A, if it has
bought service to destination E from network C or D. And
in access network, as shown in Fig. 8, if user G (in network
A) and network A arrive at an SLA that G will communicate
with user H in network F, then an end-to-end service can be
attained by building up bilateral agreements step-by-step in
the form of SLAs between adjacent networks.
The above work mainly discussed how to conduct inter-
domain resource transaction based on DiffServ architecture
with SLAs. But it did not mention pricing individual users
based on DiffServ and the exact price. Semret et al. [49]
established a double-layer DiffServ-based market model which
considered users, bandwidth brokers and bandwidth sellers in
the market. Each service class has its own bandwidth broker
which belongs to bandwidth seller. The authors concluded
that competitions among bandwidth brokers will lead physical
bandwidths to an effectively division for various classes of
services. Users adopt SLAs to negotiate services and prices
with bandwidth brokers. And driven by dynamic market,
bandwidth division among various service classes will finally
be stable and efficient.
Similarly, Wang and Schulzrinne proposed a framework
named Resource Negotiation and Pricing (RNAP) [50]. They
pointed out that pricing for reserved resource should be con-
ducted differently on two levels. In an edge network, users and
ISPs negotiate based on single flow. And in the core network,
users’ requests with the same service level and consultation
interval are aggregated to process together. Finally, network
resources are allocated based on single flow in the edge
network. In [51], Wang and Schulzrinne built an optimization
model to study pricing and the corresponding implementation
which introduced access control to aid resource allocation.
And they analyzed the resulting resource utilization in a
differentiated service network. The authors concluded that
congestion-sensitive pricing combined with user-controllable
traffic rate not only can achieve congestion control to a large
extent, but also can guarantee QoS requirements of different
service classes. Since all routers participate in congestion
pricing along transmission path, their work is more complex
than edge pricing by Yukesl [44].
In [52], the authors proposed a pricing mechanism that
differs the core/edge network pricing. They claimed to charge
users in access side with a Time of Day (TOD) price which
can dynamically reflect congestion degree in core networks.
For core networks (as shown in Fig. 8), dynamic pricing
based on congestion for differentiated services is studied,
where adaptable prices are published as signs of core network
congestion status. The advantages are as follows: (1) Since
access control can be conducted in user end system or edge
network, it reduces network control information transmission
and simplifies the core network processes; (2) On the other
hand, as this pricing is based on DiffServ and concerns
economic objectives and resource usage efficiency, it is easy to
achieve a certain level of economic efficiency when providing
QoS differentiated services. So, it is a flexible, scalable and
efficient pricing mechanism in DiffServ architecture.
C. Discussion
Based on two types of network services considering QoS or
not (best-effort service and QoS guaranteed service), we intro-
duce two kinds of pricing mechanisms in this section. For the
former, edge pricing is a relatively suitable implementation,
PMP has also been proposed as a variation. And for the latter,
we introduce the pricing mechanisms proposed mainly within
the scope of pricing, which serve two service architectures
named IntServ and DiffServ.
For best-effort service, Shenker et al. believed that if
edge pricing uses expected congestion information, it can
also achieve a certain degree of congestion control. Also,
one can distinguish access bandwidths to achieve some kind
of prioritized services. But both of them cannot assure the
usage efficiency of resources and guarantee QoS or network
performance.
For QoS-based service pricing, as QoS is differentiated
by packet processing based on service classification or re-
source reservation, which often needs support from devices
or networks on the entire transmission path, and thus is
more complex than the former pricing mechanism. Especially
for IntServ pricing, as QoS is guaranteed based on resource
reservations where the service mechanism itself is complex,
the corresponding ricing process can be even difficult with
higher complexity. However, when it comes to service dif-
ferentiation or DiffServ, from the perspective of efficiency,
to a certain extent, we can conclude that it facilitates the
efficient use of resources (high QoS requiring packets are
prioritized processed) and ensures fairness among users (i.e.,
which service class or agreement is chosen by users), though
there is no assured QoS guarantee. Indeed, combining IntServ
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(in edge network) with DiffServ (in core network) to provide
differentiated services can have low complexity and improve
efficiency with a certain degree of QoS guarantee.
IV. PRICING METHODS
The above sections introduced pricing models that decide
price structure/factors and the service types based pricing
mechanisms that decide how to match price models and
services. In this section, we will introduce pricing methods
which determine appropriate price levels.
In microeconomics, the price level depends on market en-
vironments or structures (such as monopolistic or competitive
network [56]), which is calculated based on related pricing
theories in the field of microeconomics. In network research
area, besides considering on the market, resource pricing is
also affected by network service mechanisms, and price is
settled through modeling of utility optimization interactions
of various entities.
We will introduce two main network pricing methods here:
(1) System optimization models mainly based on network
utility maximization (NUM [30][31]) framework; (2) Strategic
optimization models, i.e., when setting prices or making other
decisions, consider strategic behaviors of the others.
A. Pricing based on NUM
From an economic point of view, efficient market means
total social surplus or the sum of service providers’ surplus and
users’ surplus is maximized [61], which equals to the differ-
ence maximization between the value of resources to users and
the cost of providers. Under different market environments,
different conclusions can be drawn. We mainly introduce
system utility (social surplus) optimization oriented pricing
method for a single network based on the optimization theory.
The system is consisted of users with different utility functions
and a network with resource constraints [29]. In fact, this
research line has a tremendous influence on communication
networks. It prompted an in-depth understanding of network
architecture and a guided protocol design for more efficient
network resource usages.
Kelly [30] proposed the concept of Network Utility Maxi-
mization (NUM) which is the initial work of Internet system
optimization. In his work of pricing and resource allocation,
the main object is to find the price that can make the total re-
source demand and supply in equilibrium. According to market
pricing theory in [56], if a system is in demand- supply equi-
librium, the system utility or social surplus will be maximized.
NUM framework can be described by three optimization prob-
lems. The system optimization is a radical problem which can
be first modeled as: maxmize
∑
s
Us(xs) (the service provider’s
cost is ignored), where xs denotes the traffic rate and Us
denotes the value or utility of the traffic to the corresponding
user. The constraints are: (1) Hy = x, where Hs×r denotes
the source-destination pair i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s} is served by path
j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r}, and vector y = {y1, y2, · · · , yr}T denotes
the resources distributed to all source-destination pairs on
each feasible path. This constraint means the whole distributed
resources equal to xs for any user; (2) Ay ≤ C, where A is
a 0-1 matrix telling whether the distributed resource is on the
link, and the constraint means the sum of all the distributed
resources will be no more than link capacity C; (3) x, y ≥ 0.
The above can be rewritten as the whole problem (A):
SYSTEM[U,H,A,C] :
maxmize
∑
s
Us(xs)
subsect to Hy = x,Ay ≤ C
over x, y ≥ 0
(1)
As user utility is unknown to the system, solving (A) is
equal to solving two sub-optimization problems. One is on the
user side, based on the per unit traffic rate price λs. An user
optimizes its surplus Us(ms/λs)−ms by deciding how much
to pay ms (the rate can be indirectly decided by xs = ms/λs),
shown in the following problem (B):
USERs[Us;λs] :
maxmize Us(ms/λs)−ms
over ms ≥ 0 (2)
The other sub-problem is on the network side. According to
users’ feedbacks, the network conducts optimization process
and refers to some fairness standards to allocate network band-
width to different flows. Namely, given m = (m1,m2, ...,ms),
it tries to distribute bandwidth by maximizing
∑
s
ms log xs,
which indicates dividing bandwidth based on weighted propor-
tional fairness. Then the corresponding network optimization
problem (C) is:
NETWORK[H,A,C;m] :
maxmize
∑
s
ms log xs
subsect to Hy = x,Ay ≤ C
over x, y ≥ 0
(3)
where H , A and C denote the network status with the same
meaning in Eq. (1). The author pointed out that if ∀s, Us(·) is
concave function, then from [30] we know that this convex
optimization problem has a unique optimal solution x∗ =
(x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
s). And author showed for λ
∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, ..., λ
∗
s),
and m∗ = (m∗1,m
∗
2, ...,m
∗
s), m
∗
s = λ
∗
sx
∗
s holds for every
s ∈ S. Then the three optimization problems are all solved
with consistent solutions. The vector x∗ is the unique optimal
allocating rate and λ∗ is the current optimal resource price
vector.
System optimization problem (A) can also be decomposed
into other types of sub-optimal problems, but the essence is
not changed. So we skip it here. Kelly [31] further discussed
the stability of the above mentioned rate allocation algorithm
when the system is added in random disturbance and time
delay. As to concrete solutions to the problem, since Kelly
mainly modeled the elastic system, where users’ utilities are
all concave functions (reasonable when modeling traditional
data services, such as file transfer, which is not very sensitive
to delay), optimal solutions can be got based on the convex
optimization theory. Similarly, some work [31][70][73] also
use concave utility function to build models. Besides, the
authors in [32] discussed a method that uses underlying buffer
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management to implement end-to-end proportional resource
allocation, which can support Kelly’s work.
Unlike the centralized resource allocation method, Ozdaglar
and Srikant [74] pointed out that if resources are distributively
allocated like the above algorithm, then achieving system goals
requires: (1) The end users should adjust their rates according
to congestion feedbacks sent from the network (indicated by
price); (2) The network routers should calculate the price
which can reflect congestion status of each link starting
from the router; (3) The network should be able to return
the congestion information (price) to users. However, while
the elastic flow rate can be adjusted according to network
conditions (worked as TCP), in engineering, how to control
rate based on the price is still not resolved. Practically, services
with network feedback mechanisms are able to adopt such
pricing method.
In addition, users’ controlling rates based on network feed-
backs are not easy to implement as discussed in [74]. Based
on the fair end-to-end congestion control mechanism proposed
by Mo and Walrand [10], La and Anantharam [63] proposed
a distributed algorithm where users can determine their rate
adjustments according to their perceived network status. In
their work, each user pays for queuing delay caused to others
by its own packets. The authors proved the convergence of the
algorithm, and showed it can solve this system optimization
problem. It pointed out that packet loss rate can be used to
formulate the optimization model as well.
In this class of system (or users) utility maximization pricing
work, rate allocation is based on user’s willingness to pay
(concave utility function). However, in fact, such willingness
will vary with different types of applications. For example,
for video and voice applications, if transmission rate is less
than a certain value, user’s experience will decline sharply (as
shown in Fig. 8). This indicates that S-type utility function
should be used to model user’s utility. And thus the convex
optimization framework of NUM will no longer apply. The
resulting system can be seen as a hybrid service system, as
shown in Fig. 8, which includes different flows described by
various types of utilities. Therefore, the pricing and resource
allocation problem becomes a difficult non-convex optimiza-
tion problem which should deal with competitive flows with
different service characteristics [64][72].
Jang-Won et al. [64][65] showed that in a real network
environment (i.e., hybrid service systems), if the flows are all
modeled by concave utility functions, then under the NUM
framework, the resulting rate allocation will probably cause
network congestion and high jitter. To achieve the optimal
system resource usage when heterogeneous flows coexist, they
studied distributed rate allocation and the corresponding pric-
ing in a hybrid service system, and tried to design a reasonable
incentive mechanism to incentivize users’ transmission can-
cellations. Such user behavior is called “self-regulate” which
is similar to the end system access control. The distributed
algorithm is described as follows. For users, based on current
price per unit rate, it decides the total transmission rate to
maximize utility each time. And for network links, based on
aggregated transmission rate, it solves network optimization
problem and calculates unit rate price in next iteration. Mathe-
matically, as the primal problem is non-convex, the duality gap
may exist. This means the primal problem may not converge
to the optimal, so the authors further designed asymptotical
optimal resource allocation algorithm.
Unlike the approximate optimal solution in [66], Chiang
et al. [66] and Hande et al. [67][68] studied rate allocation
optimization framework for inelastic flows, and presented the
sufficient and necessary conditions for the convergence to the
global optimum of the proposed distributed rate allocation
algorithm. In contrast to the work by Jang-Won et al. [64],
Chiang et al. [66] generalized the user utilities for different
types of time-sensitive flows. They modeled them using non-
convex optimization tools, and proposed heuristic access con-
trol algorithm and rate allocation algorithm. Similarly, con-
sidering the real-time flows, Hande et al. [67][68] introduced
price-based distributed access control method and proposed a
fair resource distribution method when various types of flows
coexist. It emphasizes QoS-guarantee for the elastic flows and
is realized by a proposed heuristic algorithm.
In fact, since some researchers considered the access re-
source is most scarce and should be the study focus [70],
in edge pricing model, the NUM framework has also been
expanded and applied. For example, based on NUM, Hande
et al. [70] studied the edge pricing in a monopoly market
when ISP aims to maximize its revenue, and the user utility
is modeled by standard α-fairness based on different demand
elasticity, namely:
u(x) =
{
(1− α)−1x1−α, 0 ≤ α < 1
log(x), α = 1.
(4)
Unlike Kelly’s workthe authors emphasized that in edge net-
work, pricing structure can be a linear pricing combination
composed by time-related flat fee and usage fee (e.g., g+h·x).
They analyzed each part’s effect on ISP’s revenue or what if
using non-linear pricing.
Currently, taking into account that the traffic is actually
delivered from sender to receiver, the sender and receiver
(supplier and demander) may have different utilities to such
traffic. So, ISPs need to set a supply-demand balanced price
to maximize its revenue. Hande et al. [69] extended the NUM
framework by adding content providers (CPs) to the system
optimization model. They concluded that no matter under
which network marketing environment (complete competition
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or monopoly), considering the supply-demand relationship,
if CPs are charged to compensate users, the overall system
revenue and the utility of CPs will be sure to increase. The
paper also discussed network neutrality (NN [94], that is,
ISPs should not charge CPs by differentiating service quality
or bases on content types) issue. If NN is equivalent to a
constrained pricing for CP, then charging CPs can also improve
system efficiency.
B. Pricing based on game theory
Within a single ISP network, system equilibrium based
on supply-demand relationship can ensure optimal pricing
which maximizes system utility in Section 4.1. This type of
equilibrium is achieved through pricing where the ISP and
users indirectly interact with each other. However, in real
network, there are three types of relationships: ISP-ISP, ISP-
users, and user-user. Most of them are modeled by considering
their direct interactive effects.
Game theory studies how individual decision is made con-
sidering others’ actions. And it also predicts whether there
exists an equilibrium under such strategic behaviors. The
utilities in this type of model are directly affected by the other
participants’ strategies or preferences. Thus when studying the
direct effects among network participates’ behaviors, game
theory is always used as a basic theory. Based on whether
a binding agreement can be formed, games are divided into
non-cooperative games [75][86] and cooperative games [83]-
[85].
1) Non-cooperative game model: Considering non-
cooperative games in network resource pricing and allocation,
three levels of such interactions can be identified. (1)
Competition among Multi-ISPs in network market. As users
will purchase services from the most attractive ISP, so when
an ISP decides pricing, it should consider the other ISPs’
behaviors as well; (2) Leader-follower game between ISP
and users. If ISPs consider users’ reflection directly (e.g.,
not based on resulting demand as shown in Section 4.1, but
beforehand consider how the price will affect the resulting
demand), then this type of interaction can also be regarded
as a game between ISPs and users; (3) Resource competition
among users. Due to the externality caused by individual user
to others, such internal impact can also be abstracted as a
non-cooperative game.
Multi-ISP interaction research has great challenges. Besides
modelling similarities and difference among ISPs, impacts
to underlay user behaviors should also be considered.
Therefore, mature research results are still lacking today. In
this section, we will mainly introduce the other two kinds
of non-cooperative games (i.e., the above mentioned (2) and
(3)). Two basic models frequently used here are n-person
non-cooperative game model and leader-follower game model.
The former emphasizes dynamic processes of a game, and
the latter mainly considers static game equilibrium.
It is reasonable to study above mentioned relationships in
a single ISP network, since there indeed exists monopoly
network market and thus the interference from other ISPs
can be largely avoided. Then for modeling relationship (2),
in a monopoly network market, single leader-follower game
model (such as Stackelberg [77]-[81][89]) is always used.
According to how much users’ utility information known by
the ISP, such work can be divided into two kinds: pricing
with complete or incomplete information. For modeling
relationship (3), n-person non-cooperative game is always
used. Here each one’s behavior affects the others’ utilities,
which is similar to externality mentioned in the foregoing
discussion on congestion pricing.
Generally, in the leader-follower network resource pricing
model, a leader (ISP) sets price strategically, and the followers
(users) act as price takers, who decide how much resource
to buy mostly based on the given price. The point here
is that when the leader decides price, it sets one that can
maximize its revenue based on predicted users’ reflections.
In the n-person non-cooperative game, the stable state where
none of participates wants to deviate from its behaviors when
others’ strategies are known, or NE (Nash Equilibrium [75])
is the major concern. An instance that combines the two
models is presented by Basar and Srikant [78]-[81].
Specifically, in [79], the authors used non-cooperative
game models to study pricing issues in a single-link network.
They built two layers of games: non-cooperative game related
to resource competition among users and Stackelberg game
where an ISP maximizes benefits within resource constraints
based on predicting users’ reflection. In the first layer model,
each user maximizes its goal described by the following Eq.
(5) to decide rate:
Fi(xi, x−i; p) = wi log(1 + xi)− 1
nc−∑
j
xj
− pxi (5)
where xi is user’s transmitting rate, nc is link capacity,
wi log(1 + xi) is user’s utility function, 1nc−∑
j
xj
represents
congestion cost (i.e.,queuing delay computed using M/M/1
queuing model), and p is the unit price charged by ISP.
Using related theory, the authors prove that the users’ non-
cooperative game has NE, i.e., for any user i, the solution x∗i
holds:
maxmize
0≤x≤nc−x∗−i
Fi(xi, x
∗
−i; p) = Fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i; p) (6)
It means that the decision made is the optimal one correspond-
ing to all the others’ optimal decisions.
In the second layer game model, authors hypothesized that
the ISP aims to maximize the benefits by solving Eq. (7), and
thus obtain the unit resource price p.
maxmize
p≥0
L(p;x∗(p)), L(p;x) := p · x (7)
where x∗(p) :=
∑
i x
∗
j (p) represents the sum of all individu-
als’ rates in NE of such non-cooperative game.
The entire solving steps are as follows. Firstly, according
to Eq. (5), it shows that adding up all utility functions of
users will not change the NE point. The authors derived a
user equivalent optimization problem in Eq. (8):
F (x1, · · · , xn; p) =
n∑
j=1
wj log(1 + xj)− 1
nc− x − px (8)
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where all utilities are added together; Secondly, by solving the
convex optimization problem, unique optimal solution x∗(p)
can be obtained (notice that the solution is a function on
price p). Thirdly, deduce the above solution to Eq. (7) as a
single-variable optimization problem. And solve it directly can
obtain the optimal price p∗. The authors then discussed what
will happen for different link bandwidths here, and analyzed
how the price, revenue and user’s utility related with each
other. They claimed that if the ISP expands bandwidth in
proportion to the user number, then it will increase its revenue
accordingly. However, it indicates that the users are expected
to conduct congestion control based on the price and achieved
service. And under certain circumstances, the solution will be
consistent with Kelly’s system optimal solution based on NUM
model. The authors gave an extended discussion in the case
of multi-link afterwards [78].
Similar to the above mentioned non-cooperative game
framework, Shen and Basar [81] extended the model to
study non-linear optimal pricing in the cases of complete and
incomplete information of users’ utilities. They concluded that
in the complete information (users’ utilities are known by
ISP) case, non-linear price can increase ISP’s revenue by 38%
compared with revenue gained by linear price. While if users’
utilities are unknown (incomplete information), there is about
25% -40% of the benefit loss. Li, Huang and Robert Li [71]
also considered optimal pricing in a monopoly market with
incomplete information. But they did not directly model users’
non-cooperative behaviors.
However, when an ISP prices users, in addition to consid-
ering the users’ response strategies, the market environment is
also taken into account. For example, in a multi-ISP market,
ISPs compete for users, and their price are affected by others.
Thus the applicable game theory models will be very complex.
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [82] claimed that unlike in the
monopoly case where system efficiency can be improved and
the social optimal is achieved at the equilibrium, in the multi-
ISPs competition game [61], the pure strategy NE may not
exist (depending on cost function). And unlike the conclusions
drawn from economics, the increasing competition will reduce
system efficiency. Besides, the upper and lower bounds of
possible loss are also discussed.
2) Cooperative game model: Historically, the well-studied
cooperation game models in network resource pricing are
the Nash Bargaining Game [83][84] and the Shapley value
[85] model. These two models both belong to the axiomatic
method, and thus their solutions satisfy certain properties. The
former comes to Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) with Pareto
optimal property and a certain sense of fairness. The latter
satisfies several good properties as well, which include well-
formulated marginal contribution concept and the correspond-
ing calculation methods. As a new trend, in recent years, such
cooperative game models are studied and gradually applied to
the modeling of network resource pricing.
In [87], the authors assumed all network users have the
same behavior characteristics and preferences. Therefore they
simplified the problem as a game between a single user
and one ISP. Based on theoretical analysis, they concluded
that compared with the results in leader-follower game, Nash
bargaining performed by ISPs and users can make the system
operate at Pareto efficient (one cannot increase its utility
without reducing others’ utilities) operation point. In [88],
based on Nash bargaining game, the authors studied network
resource pricing and distributed allocation within a network
with multiple heterogeneous users. We briefly introduce it as
follows:
First, the ISP faces a centralized resource allocation prob-
lem, in accordance with the concept of Nash bargaining.
Such problem can be formulated as the following constrained
convex optimization problem:
maximize
N∏
i=1
(xi −MRi)
subsect to xi ≥MRi,
xi ≤ PRi,
(Ax)l ≤ (C)l.
(9)
where xi is resource (rate) assigned to user i, MRi and
PRi are the minimum and peak rate requirements of user
i. Based on optimization theory, it is easy to know that there
is a unique optimal solution. However, such central solution
always brings in a lot of network communication burdens.
Therefore, the authors proposed a distributed model where
each user optimizes its utility with an added penalty αixi,
and the aggregated rate is expected to ensure that the system
can operate at the optimal point (Pareto optimal). Thus, for
each user, it optimize Eq. (10) for rate selection:
maximize
xi
ln(xi −MRi)− αixi
subsect to xi ≥MRi,
xi ≤ PRi.
(10)
Similar to the leader-follower game in Section 4.2.1, the
network here needs to solve the rate allocation problem which
can maximize its revenue. Besides, the revenue is calculated
by the sum of penalties, as shown in Eq. (11). The constraints
conditions are the same as in Eq. (9).
maximize
N∑
i=1
αixi (11)
The authors designed and implemented an asynchronous
distributed algorithm with the corresponding information ex-
change method, and showed that the solutions of Eq. (11) by
network and Eq. (10) by users are equal to Nash bargaining
solutions of the centralized problem in Eq. (9). The point is
that such distributed method can maximize users’ utilities as
well as the network’s revenue.
Shapley value is mostly used in modeling for cost sharing
or revenue distribution among multiple ISPs. Different from
pricing directly based on usage information (such as pricing of
core network [52] in Section 3.2.3), Shapley value emphasizes
revenue distribution based on the contribution of each entity
in a group. As an axiomatic method which ensures a unique
solution, it has some special characteristics and is gradu-
ally applied to network resource pricing [92][93]. However,
high calculation complexity is an obvious drawback (e.g.,
N participants needs 2N scale of computations). Besides, its
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requirements for a centralized allocation process also make it
less scalable.
C. Discussion
We classified and summarized typical pricing methods of
network resources based on two main research lines. The main
points are as follows:
(1) System optimization model mainly based on the NUM
framework. Considering network traffic characteristics, it can
be divided into: i) Optimization model for elastic flow system;
ii) Optimization model for hybrid system where inelastic and
elastic flows coexist.
This class of work is usually based on supply-demand
relationship. It aims to find the optimal price and rate allo-
cation with balanced supply and demand where the maximal
system efficiency is achieved. As inelastic traffics (such as
real-time video and voice flows) emerge and largely increase,
system optimization for hybrid network has drawn more and
more attentions. Compared with elastic flow system optimiza-
tion which has unique optimal solution shown by convex
optimization theory, inelastic flows are always described by
S-type utility function. Thus it turns the system problem
into a complex non-convex optimization problem. Therefore,
price-based access control is mainly introduced here to assist
resource distribution. It generally includes two methods: users’
self-regulation [65] based on their own utilities and the net-
work conducted access control based on network efficiency
[67]. Hande et al. [68] considered elastic flow protection in
hybrid system. They believed that the elastic traffics are less
competitive than the inelastic flows.
In short, optimization-based modeling for hybrid system
has high complexity, and especially hard to solve in real
systems. Also, as on a network transmission path, access
control policies of each link may be different, there lacks
well-designed distributed decision-making mechanisms which
can ensure system convergence to the global optimal rate
allocation.
(2) Strategic optimization model based on game theory.
Based on two major branches of game theory: non-cooperative
game and cooperative game, we introduce some typical cor-
responding models used in network resource pricing.
As modeling for strategic interactions, non-cooperative
game model mainly discusses NE point and its characteristics.
Cooperative game model we introduced here emphasizes the
fairness criteria in sharing. The point is that the solution of
the former may not be Pareto optimal, however, the latter
sometimes needs constraints from a third party to ensure
cooperation.
Comparing the above system optimization model with the
non-cooperative game model, it is obvious that different
model ideas always need support from different theories. In
NUM framework based system optimization, the equilibrium
is achieved by indirect interactions between the network and
users based on price. And in this process, ISP dynamically
controls the system through pricing mechanism to help reach
an optimal equilibrium. Non-cooperative game model directly
analyzes pricing problem based on strategic behaviors of all
participants, which can quickly determine whether the system
has NE point or not. However, it is possible that the equilib-
rium point exists but is not achievable. Then, the uniqueness
and stability of the existed NE will also be discussed mainly
using optimization theory. In fact, if models have equal es-
sential meanings for key parameters (e.g., revenue and cost),
the results based on different basic theories (NUM or non-
cooperative game) are nearly the same.
V. CLASSIFICATION AND COMPARISON OF PRICING
STRATEGIES
In this section, based on pricing models, service mecha-
nisms and price level setting methods, we conduct classifica-
tion and comparison of the introduced typical pricing strategies
shown in Table 1. (In order to describe the pricing for QoS
guaranteed service, we add QoS contract in pricing model,
which represents the achieved service and price agreements
between ISPs and users).
Early pricing models lack of theory basis. Most of them are
based on experiments, and cannot cover a complete decom-
position and classification. Some articles focused on studying
pricing methods, but consider less about the underlying types
of services. Since there are no separated pricing for QoS, we
generally assume they are applicable for best-effort network,
and make no special mark for them in Table 1. In addition, the
QoS guaranteed types of services correspond to what we have
described in Section 3.2. For pricing models, if both usage and
access are chosen, it means that the pricing model is combined
by the two.
Considering implementation, pricing for different types of
services inherently have different complexities. For best-effort
network, pricing is always done at network edge, and needs
less overhead cost. For QoS guaranteed services, since pricing
relates with QoS along the whole serving path, it involves
higher audition and accounting cost. But it can also achieve
a certain degree of cost sharing (i.e., the sender and receiver
consult on cost sharing). In short, the latter generally has a
better QoS and higher network efficiency though at the cost
of complexity.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In recent years, with the continuous development of
high-bandwidth applications, content distribution technologies
(such as CDN and P2P) are increasingly mature, and the
network traffic surges. Thus network service quality has
drawn more and more attentions. However, the engineering
resource management and congestion control tend to have high
technical difficulties, making network performance guarantee
and maintenance even harder. Therefore, as a method that
alleviates or resolves this problem by affecting active resource
demand and usage, network resource pricing has important
research values other than for ISPs to achieve economic
goals. Besides, as QoS guaranteed services are getting more
mature, and thus the pricing acts as an important auxiliary
to incentivize technological progress, it is equally important
to study pricing mechanism that is applicable to continuous
renewal service types.
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TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF PRICING STRATEGIES.
Pricing Model Service Type Pricing Method
Access Usage Con- QoS Best QoS-guarantee System Game Model Example
gestion Contract Effort Priority IntServ DiffServ Model Non-co Co
X X [21][22]
X X X [25][27]
X X X [23]
X X X X [26]
X X X X [19]
X X X [30][31]
X X (MD) [35]
X X X [36]
X X [38][39]
X X X [55]
X X X X [54]
X X X [13][14]
[53]
X X X [56]-[57]
X X [45][46]
X X X X (MD) [47]
X X X X (MD) [49]
X X X X [51]
X X X X [52]
X X X [63]
X X X X [64]-[68]
[72][73]
X X X X [70]
X X X 69][71]
X X X [78]-[82]
X X X X [87][88]
X X X [91][92]
In this table, the symbol X in each row represents a feature hold by the pricing strategy example in the last column , and the symbol (MD)
means mechanism design.
In addition to pricing models and the corresponding service
mechanisms, a complete pricing strategy also includes pricing
methods deciding how much to charge. As shown in Fig. 2,
we survey pricing issues from three different perspectives. We
first introduce three basic pricing models: flat pricing, usage
pricing and congestion pricing. And we conclude that with
the development of network applications, research on pric-
ing models turns more complex. Then, we introduce pricing
mechanism which combines pricing model with service types.
The mechanism aims to ensure pricing implementation under
certain service types, such as transfer pricing information in
DiffServ network. We notice that resource management for
QoS differentiated networks with multi-class services mainly
uses price-based access control. Then, from price level setting
aspect, we highlight system optimization based on the NUM
framework and strategic optimization based on game theory in
a single ISP network. We conclude that the non-cooperative
game models are often limited in related optimization theories
to prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium. They are
applicable only in part of (e.g., elastic flow system) models.
And due to the incomplete information in such game, there is
often a long distance from its actual application.
To sum up, with the fast development of applications, ser-
vice types, and corresponding theories, pricing related issues
are constantly updated and studied. However, whichever pric-
ing strategy we adopt, the basic pricing models and methods
hardly change. For example, if the appropriate flat pricing
brings in tolerable system efficiency loss, given its simplicity,
such work should be revalued [89]. Through extensive study
on network resource pricing strategies and deep analysis on
the status quo, we can draw the following conclusions:
1) Network resource or service pricing can be used as
an effective tool to prompt technical progress, support
QoS improvement, and/or enhance network efficiency
economically.
2) Economic oriented pricing strategy for network resource
or service to price for QoS differentiation is still a
hot research point, which also needs support from the
corresponding complete service mechanisms.
3) Pricing is expected to be scalable and easy to implement.
It requires that besides mature theoretical models, well-
designed mechanisms should also be implemented to
help achieve pricing goals (such as maximizing resource
usage efficiency or economic efficiency).
4) As ISPs’ revenue division will indirectly affect service
quality and pricing of network users. Fair and imple-
mentable cooperation mechanism with win-win results
among ISPs is also a hot topic for future research
(e.g., in [91][92], fair revenue sharing models based on
cooperative game theory were preliminary studied).
What’s more, the models discussed above are unilateral mar-
ket models whose network services include content provision.
But if content providers and ordinary users (both have been
modeled as users) are separately considered, then under such
bilateral network market, pricing will involve more complex
interactions. Also, the network neutrality concept [93] has
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been lately proposed, which causes more debates on whether
the content should be charged differently. And we can infer
that content-based pricing may also be discussed as part of
pricing models in the near future.
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